agents · safety architecture

Authority should increase with consequence

Reading a program, changing a project, deploying software and actuating a machine are different action classes. The tool contract should make that difference explicit.

action ladder
L0ObserveRead source, diagnostics, project or runtime state.read-only
L1AnalyzeCompile, inspect semantics or verify in staged contexts.current building blocks
L2ProposeConstruct a patch, migration or plan without applying it.agent workflow
L3MutatePersistently change source or an offline project.transaction admission for reviewed routes
L4DeployChange controller software or persistent runtime configuration.elevated, operation-specific authority
L5ActuateIntentionally affect a physical machine or process.strongest boundary
transaction boundary

Consequential changes need a lifecycle

01Plan + blast radius
02Authorize the concrete change
03Verify base revision
04Snapshot / preimage
05Apply once
06Compiler + vendor verification
07Commit on required evidence
08Rollback and verify restoration

The model proposes

Prompt instructions are not the enforcement boundary.

2ot enforces underneath

Action class, authorization, transaction state and evidence belong below the model.

Rollback ≠ physical undo

Engineering state can be restored; physical history may only be compensated.

CURRENT VS DIRECTION

The source includes an action-class/effects registry, default MCP authorization (maximum Propose), raw-mutation denial and a protected transaction service for reviewed consequential operations. This does not establish universal vendor rollback, controller safety or physical actuation guarantees; those require target-specific evidence.

Architecture →

MCP rejection identifiers in the current source

The MCP dispatcher rejects ineligible raw consequential operations using raw_consequential_forbidden with reason transaction_route_unavailable. Other policy-denial codes include safety_unclassified, authorization_denied, inconsistent_effects and transaction_required_missing. The result is an MCP permission-denied error, not a successful transaction receipt. Tools refused during discovery may never appear in the MCP tool list.

On an appropriately configured local stdio MCP server, transaction_planmay propose a reviewed workspace replacement transaction. External approver authority and a separately protected execution step remain mandatory. No controller or physical safety guarantee follows from this planning capability.