Authority should increase with consequence
Reading a program, changing a project, deploying software and actuating a machine are different action classes. The tool contract should make that difference explicit.
Consequential changes need a lifecycle
The model proposes
Prompt instructions are not the enforcement boundary.
2ot enforces underneath
Action class, authorization, transaction state and evidence belong below the model.
Rollback ≠ physical undo
Engineering state can be restored; physical history may only be compensated.
The source includes an action-class/effects registry, default MCP authorization (maximum Propose), raw-mutation denial and a protected transaction service for reviewed consequential operations. This does not establish universal vendor rollback, controller safety or physical actuation guarantees; those require target-specific evidence.
MCP rejection identifiers in the current source
The MCP dispatcher rejects ineligible raw consequential operations using raw_consequential_forbidden with reason transaction_route_unavailable. Other policy-denial codes include safety_unclassified, authorization_denied, inconsistent_effects and transaction_required_missing. The result is an MCP permission-denied error, not a successful transaction receipt. Tools refused during discovery may never appear in the MCP tool list.
On an appropriately configured local stdio MCP server, transaction_planmay propose a reviewed workspace replacement transaction. External approver authority and a separately protected execution step remain mandatory. No controller or physical safety guarantee follows from this planning capability.